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LEGAL EDUCATION: ITS CAUSE AND CUREt 
Marc Feldman* 
Jay M. Feinman** 
LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850s TO 
THE 1980s. By Robert Stevens. Chapel Hill: The University of 
North Carolina Press (Studies in Legal History). 1983. Pp. xvi, 334. 
$19.95. 
Until recently, lawyers and legal scholars1 neglected the history 
of American law and its interaction with other forms of social pro-
cess. 2 That neglect is being corrected. But the surge of interest in 
American legal history generally is only beginning to produce a sim-
ilar interest in the history of legal education.3 Now, Robert Stevens, 
proceeding with perspective gained by withdrawing from direct par-
ticipation in the law school process,4 has written the first comprehen-
sive account of the development of legal education in ~erica. 
Among other goals, the new legal history attempts to reconstruct 
t See Gilmore, Legal Realism: Its Cause and Cure, 10 YALE L.J. 1037 (1961); Tushnet, 
Legal Scholarship: Its Causes and Cure, 90 YALE L.J. 1205 (1981). 
Parts II and III of this review are condensed from a manuscript entitled "Pedagogy and 
Politics" that we are now preparing. The manuscript presents a conceptual approach to law, 
lawyering and learning and discusses as a case study our course in Contorts (Contracts, Torts, 
and Legal Research and Writing). · 
* Associate Professor of Law, Rutgers University School of Law, Camden. B.A. 1970, 
Washington Unive~sity; LL.M. 1981, Harvard University. - Ed. 
** Associate Professor of Law, Rutgers University School of Law, Camden. B.A. 1972, 
American University; J.D. 1975, University of Chicago. - Ed. 
1. The differentiation of academic law and legal practice makes the differentiated form of 
reference almost irresistible, although the two groups do overlap. See pp. 38-39. 
2. The definitive historiography is Gordon, Introduction: J. Willard Hurst and the Common 
Law Tradition in American Legal Historiography, 10 LAW & SocY. REV. 9 (1975). 
3. Notable exceptions are Stevens' earlier work and the research of Anthony Chase on the 
origins of modem legal education. Stevens, Two Cheers far 1870: The American Law School, 5 
PERSP. AM. HisT. 405 (1971); Chase, The Birth of the Modern Law School, 23 AM. J. LEGAL 
HIST. 329 (1979). See also First, Competition in the Legal Education Industry, 53 N.Y.U. L. 
REv. 311 (1978). Other important contributions include relevant portions of Jerold Auerbach's 
book on the legal profession and John Henry Schlegel's research on legal realism, J. 
AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE 74-87, 88-94, 108-11, 166-67, 275-77 (1976); Schlegel.American 
Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science: From the Yale Experience, 28 BUFFALO L. REV. 
459 (1979); Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science: The Singular Case 
of Underhill Moore, 29 BUFFALO L. REV. 195 (1981). 
A genre of the history of legal education more notorious than notable is the institutional 
history of an individual law school. See Konefsky & Schlegel, Mirror, Mirror on the Wall: 
Histories of American Law Schools, 95 HARV. L. REv. 833 (1982). 
4. Formerly on the faculty of Yale Law School, Stevens is now president of Haverford 
College. 
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the way lawyers and judges in different periods thought about legal 
doctrine, legal institutions, and their own place in society; that is, 
their attempts to situate themselves, their actions, and their beliefs in 
a coherent social vision.5 Stevens' Law School chronicles the devel-
opment of beliefs about law, lawyering, and learning held by the bar 
and the professoriate and the legacy of those beliefs in shaping the 
law schools of today. His account provides the material for a 
description of the social vision of those engaged in legal education, 
although Stevens does not himself describe that vision. Indeed, be-
cause the book uses traditional approaches to traditional themes in 
thinking about legal education, it is itself an example of that vision. 
In Part I of this review we discuss the book, its considerable 
strengths, and its limits. In Part II we explicate and criticize the 
premises of modem legal education - the vision of law, lawyering, 
and learning upon which it is based. In Part III we offer a brief state-
ment of a countervision that describes both lost historical opportuni-
ties and imaginative possibilities for the improvement of legal 
education. 
l. LEGAL EDUCATION 
The greatest strength of Law School is its comprehensiveness. 
This is as encyclopedic an account of the topic as could be contained 
within a single 300-page volume. Stevens begins by describing the 
apprenticeship system in colonial America (p. 3) and concludes by 
considering the effects of the jurisprudential movements of the 
1970's on curricular and pedagogical reform (p. 275). In between, he 
relates the early preeminence of the Columbia Law School (p. 23), 
the formation of the American Bar Association (p. 92) and the Asso-
ciation of American Law Schools (p. 96), the founding of the Johns 
Hopkins Institute (pp. 139-40), and Princeton's recurrent interest in 
establishing a law school (pp. 73, 197,236) (with a suggestion that on 
this subject Princeton may have been "mesmerized by the view of its 
most illustrious president," Woodrow Wilson (p. 250 n.31)). There 
are accounts of the claim that law was science (pp. 52-56), of legal 
realism (pp. 155-63), Columbia's functional curriculum project (pp. 
137-38), 1960's student activism (p. 234), and 1970's anti-intellectual-
ism (p. 269). We also read of emerging patterns of professional self-
regulation (pp. 94-95), compulsory bar examinations and school-
based training (p. 174), the increasing economic attractiveness of 
state law schools (pp. 197-98), and the "disheartening" development 
of curricula in the post-1945 era (pp. 210-11). 
5. See generally Gordon, New Developments in Legal Theory, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A 
PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 281 (D. Kairys ed. 1982) (reviewed in this issue); Kennedy, Toward an 
Historical Understanding of Legal Consciousness: The Case of Classical Legal Thought in 
America, 3 REsEARCH L. & Soc. 3 (1980). 
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Some of the characters and events in Stevens' account are famil-
iar - Langdell's deanship (pp. 35-36), Ames' appointment as the 
first full-time law teacher with little practice experience (p. 38), Al-
fred Z. Reed of the Carnegie Foundation (pp. 112-16), and the 
enigma of Roscoe Pound (pp. 136-37) - but Stevens also describes 
the contributions of less well known but no less important figures: 
Theodore W. Dwight of Columbia (pp. 22-24), Gleason Archer of 
Suffolk Law School (pp. 80, 175-76), Edward T. Lee of John Mar-
shall Law School (p. 130 n.62), and John Bradway of the University 
of Southern California and Duke Law Schools (p. 162). 
Stevens provides a spectacular array of statistics on the legal pro-
fession and the law schools in different periods, such as the percent-
age of bar applicants with college degrees (p. 45 n.18), faculty 
salaries (pp. 71 n.89, 88 n.44), law school enrollment figures (pp. 75, 
90 n.84), and the bar examination pass rate of correspondence school 
graduates (p. 221 n.33). We learn, among other things, of the in-
creasing urbanization of law school populations in the early twenti-
eth century (p. 76), tuition costs of private versus state schools (p. 
197), the proportion of women in the law school population during 
World War II (p. 199) (and that Harvard did not admit women at all 
until 1950 (p. 203 n.63)), and-the effect of the G.I. Bill in swelling law 
school ranks after the war (p. 205). The sources for this wealth of 
data appear to include all the available published materials on legal 
education, including law school histories, commentary, and primary 
sources.6 
Fortunately, Stevens is not content simply to present a mass of 
facts. The book is usefully organized into thematic chapters 
.presented chronologically. Thus, a chapter or group of chapters 
both advances the story in time and focuses on a particular issue. 
The prologue to the main story is presented in the first two chapters, 
which discuss the forms of legal education in the colonies and the 
early republic, as well as the expansion of the bar, the growth of law 
firms, the institutionalization oflegal education, and the initial affili-
ation of law schools and universitites after the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury. Stevens suggests that professional decline in the early 
nineteenth century should not be explained as "an excess of Jackso-
nian democracy" but was, rather, part of a longer history of anti-
lawyer sentiment beginning in the colonial period (p. 8). Here Ste-
vens introduces the recurrent theme of democracy versus elitism in 
the control of admission to law practice and in the question of "pro-
fessional standards" (pp. 5-8, 24-26): "[T]he concept of providing 
part of legal training through an institution known as the law school 
had become associated with the parallel aspect of institutionalization 
6. A 26-page bibliography supports the extensive footnotes, which for some chapters ex-
ceed the text in length. 
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- the urge to raise standards and so make the bar more competent 
and more exclusive" (p. 24, footnote omitted). 
The central educational theme of Stevens' account is the 
Harvardization of legal education. Chapters 3 and 4 describe the 
partnership of Eliot, Langdell, and Ames in establishing the style, 
structure, and content of modem legal education. The most famous 
Harvard innovation is the case method (pp. 52-56), but the trio are 
also attributed with responsibility for the professionalization of law 
teaching, higher admission requirements, the sequential three-year 
program, and a curriculum of "pure law," excluding such topics as 
international law, jurisprudence, and legal history (pp. 36-40). Ste-
vens describes the slow but ultimately successful process by which 
the case method, and all that attended it, overcame its competitors. 
"Theodore Dwight refused to concede that the case method was bet-
ter 'for any student,' but he was clear it was 'inferior to true teaching 
in its effects upon those of average powers'" (p. 57, footnote omit-
ted). "Law decisions are but a labyrinth,'' 'Yrote Dwight. "Woe to 
the man who busies himself with them without a clue . . ." (p. 67 
n.27). Dwight and his followers felt compelled to resign from the 
Columbia faculty in 1891 to protest the introduction of the case 
method; eight days later Columbia formally adopted the case 
method and a three-year curriculum (p. 45 n.19). Contrary to the 
common view, many schools, elite and nonelite, resisted the case 
method until well into the twentieth century. Its-eventual triumph 
was based as much on the financial attractiveness of the large classes 
and high faculty-student ratios it permitted as on its pedagogical ef-
fectiveness or intellectual power (pp. 63-64). Nevertheless, by the 
1950's, the institutional and curricular patterns established at 
Harvard came to dominate the approach of nearly every law school 
in America. 
A related theme concerns the often-turbulent relations between 
the law schools and different segments of the organized bar: 
With the development of part-time and evening schools, for the first 
time the stratification of the profession was linked to an unacknowl-
edged but obvious hierarchy developing among the law schools. It was 
impossible for the ABA to ignore the situation; indeed,_ it had been 
formed in 1878 primarily to "improve" the profession. The association 
might have opted for institutionalizing diversity, although that \YOuld 
have run counter to the egalitarian ethos of the nation. It would have 
seemed even more un-American in the last part of the nineteenth cen-
tury, a period when standardization was a national watchword, not 
only in the profession but throughout industry and commerce. 
Whatever doubts members had about the case method, almost all were 
adamant that a uniform type of law school should control entry to the 
profession. [P. 92, citations omitted]. 
Similarly, with the establishment of the Association of American 
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Law Schools in 1900 - an organization of "reputable" law schools 
- all member schools were required to meet minimum standards. 
These homogenizing requirements dictated student admission 
profiles, three-year programs, full-time faculties, and night programs 
of greater length than day sessions (pp. 96-97). 
But neither the bar nor the academy was unitary. Stevens details 
the many conflicts among elite and nonelite bar and elite and non-
elite schools. He relates in detail and in admirably evenhanded fash-
ion the complex elements of the story, from the racial (p. 81), sexual 
(pp. 82-84), class (pp. 97-100), and religious (pp. 101, 176) prejudice 
of the leaders of the bar to the struggles of the defenders of proprie-
tary and evening law schools, such as Lee and Archer, against the 
"educational racketeers" - the "deans and professors . . . of 'case 
law' schools" (p. 175). This is a story of bitter controversies, shifting 
alliances, and uneasy compromises. 
The character of this latter theme suggests an important element 
of the book's approach. In large measure Law School is political 
history, not intellectual or educational history. In Stevens' account, 
the story of legal education in America is a story of institutional ri-
valry and the eventual dominance of the bar elite. 7 In the process of 
securing their role and, thus, their view of legal education, the full-
time professoriate enlisted the assistance of the bar elite in the form 
of the ABA. While the AALS was victorious over the proprietary, 
evening, and part-time infidels, it is the elite bar, as accreditors and 
employers, that calls the tune. 8 
Stevens evidently believes that the history of legal education and 
the rivalry between professors and practitioners have been so self-
contained that they can be recounted with only occasional reference 
to economic and political events and social movements and almost 
no reference to the broader intellectual life of the nation. The Great 
Depression put marginal law schools under financial stress (pp. 177-
78), and activism associated with the Vietnam War placed students 
on faculty committees at Yale (p. 235), but by and large in Stevens' 
account the law schools are isolated from the currents of their times. 
It seems as if events must assume the proportion of world wars, gen-
7. At first it might seem more accurate to describe the story oflegal education as an uneasy 
partnership between the elite bar and elite professoriate. But a look at the life of the law 
school and, in particular, contemporary developments in curricula and placement activities 
suggest that the organized bar is increasingly imposing its will. This is in part explained by the 
recent near-monopolization of law school accreditation and attorney licensure by the ABA. 
See note 8 infra and accompanying text. 
8. While each association has promulgated standards and accredited law schools, only the 
ABA has successfully tied its accreditation process to the licensing of attorneys. Today, gradu-
ation from an ABA-approved law school is required as a prerequisite for a bar admission in 
some forty states. As to member schools, the AALS seeks to excercise prescriptive authority 
only in the form of broad, generally consensual principles. And in the last few years, there has 
even been discussion of the AALS "going out of the accrediting business" altogether. P. 245. 
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eral economic disaster, or national political scandal before they have 
an impact upon legal education. 
Similarly, Stevens accurately if unconsciously reflects the intel-
lectual insularity of legal thought and legal education. So far as this 
book is concerned, law schools have neither influenced nor been in-
fluenced by the intellectual climate of the larger university. In dis-
cussing at some length the development of the case method and the 
rise to preeminence of the Harvard Law School (pp. 36, 38, 52-55 
and accompanying notes), Stevens notes that "[m]uch of the credit 
( or responsibility) for this ought to belong not to Langdell . . . but to 
Eliot, whose innovations on both the undergraduate and graduate 
level of the university had a powerful influence over Langdell" (p. 
36, footnote omitted). But what were these innovations? Their ori-
gins? How widespread their application? Their fate in other non-
law settings? 
Stevens does not tell us of Eliot's travels to Europe in 1863 to 
observe educational systems on the Continent and, in particular, 
medical education and its clinical paradigm. We are not told of El-
iot's educational reforms carried out at M.I.T. on his return or his 
earlier proposals for the Lawrence Scientific School. Eliot's educa-
tional theories had been put into practice by 1869 and the structural 
similarity of these theories to Langdell's "innovations" (after his ap-
pointment as Dean in 1870) is striking. Nor does Stevens describe 
the situation at Harvard University more generally when, after 1870, 
similar innovations were employed at the medical school, in the un-
dergraduate science programs, and in other departments of the 
university.9 
This insularity, this notion of autonomy, appears frequently 
throughout the book. As additional examples, one would not know 
from Stevens that legal realism was part of a much larger intellectual 
tradition influencing not only law but also art, architecture, sociol-
ogy, anthropology, political science, history and literature. And only 
the most perceptive reader would be able to catch the quickly pass-
ing reference to bar control of the content of legal education (p. 270) 
and to understand contemporary curricular developments in law as 
parallel to those in other professions, such as medicine, and as part 
of a larger culture of professionalization (p. 238). Professional spe-
cialization cannot be meaningfully understood by reference only to 
legal actors and sources. In his Prologue, Stevens describes the book 
as a "tentative step" in "linking [the history of legal education] to 
intellectual, political, and social trends" (p. xiv). In practice, the step 
is so tentative as to be indiscernible. 
The book is limited in another respect. Although Law School, 
9. Chase, The Birth of the Modem Law School, 23 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 329, 334, 336, 343 
(1979). 
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more than any previous work, considers law schools that are not 
among the high and mighty as something other than potential con-
verts or victims, Stevens' work is still to a considerable extent "win-
ners' history." The dominant educational theme is the success of the 
Harvard method, and the story of resistance is resistance at Colum-
bia, Yale and Chicago. 
Stevens asserts that the "case method showed itself . . . to be a 
brilliant teaching device" (p. 57), but is this an evaluation of its edu-
cational power or simply an expression of its durability? The case 
method is so firmly established that Stevens finds no need to describe 
in any detail what it is like in a classroom in which the case method 
is employed. For one who has not been to law school, this book is of 
little assistance in imagining and understanding daily educational 
practice. Stevens is no more helpful in offering a picture of educa-
tional practice in nonelite schools. The absence of any meaningful 
picture of the classroom mirrors the invisibility of students and 
teachers more generally in this book. 10 There are descriptions of in-
dividual professors, sometimes quite lengthy, but those profiled are 
either "big names" or referred to for their participation in notable 
events. Stevens does not even begin the task of constructing an ac-
count, for any historical period, of the daily lives of law students or 
law teachers. 
Equally absent is any sense of the practice of law school gradu-
ates - who were their clients, what were their problems, what was 
the quality of the work product and the work place? There are occa-
sional provocative references: we learn that the government agen-
cies of the New Deal were attractive to recent graduates and 
professors from Harvard and Yale (pp. 137, 141, 160, 168-69 nn. 44 
& 45) and we learn from recent bar studies that "the bulk of lawyers 
[are] still serving essentially as social workers, or at least business 
managers, to the middle-class and established communities" (pp. 
267-68). But the references go no further. Stevens does not enable 
us to picture, with any texture or depth, learning or lawyering. Ad-
mittedly, imaginative reconstruction is one of the historian's most 
difficult tasks, but it is also one of the most important. 
Even on the institutional level, one can imagine a very different 
emphasis in the story of legal education were Suffolk, Marquette, 
and John Marshall to figure as prominently as Harvard, Yale, and 
Chicago. Dean W.M. Lile of the University of Virginia resisted the 
Harvard system; it was not until 1932 when Mason Dobie succeeded 
Lile as dean that the case method became generally accepted in 
Charlottesville (p. 192).11 At the University of Montana, there was a 
"battle between the president who wanted to appoint Harvard men 
10. See Konefsky & Schlegel, supra note 3. 
II. See generally w. BRYSON, LEGAL EDUCATION IN VIRGINIA 1779-1979 (1982). 
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to the law school faculty and the State Board of Education who 
wanted local practitioners" (p. 191). In 1926, Vanderbilt and the 
University of Mississippi were expelled from the AALS because they 
would not require two years of college work before admission (p. 
195). Wisconsin Law School had been run as an "ideal law office" 
prior to adoption of the case method (p. 61). John Pomeroy evi-
dently developed at Hastings a case method quite different from that 
of Langdell (pp. 61, 66 n.14), and Richard H. Thornton established 
the University of Oregon Law School as a proprietary school but 
defied many of the weaknesses typically associated with such an ar-
rangement.12 Stevens notes these many cross-currents in the develop-
ment of legal education, but fails to provide the detail necessary to 
understand and assess them. 
Stevens tells us of the persistence and ingenuity of proprietary 
schools in responding to the "improving standards" of the ABA and 
AALS. "When Illinois demanded graduation from high school 
before studying law, the John Marshall Law School established its 
own high school for prelaw students. When Colorado decided to 
require one year of college, the state's largest . . . law school -
Westminster University School of Law - responded by opening its 
own one-year junior college, available only to potential law stu-
dents" (pp. 193-94, footnotes omitted). We also know that these 
"cut price" schools were economically attractive particularly before 
the advent of governmental aid programs, such as the G.I. Bill (p. 
205). But can nothing more be said of these "marginal schools"? Is 
it really the case, despite their numbers and long history, that they 
were without educational and other value? In noting the fate of 
three of the four black schools mentioned by Reed in his 1928 study, 
Stevens characterizes the stories as "pathetic" (p. 195). Indeed, that 
these important sources of training for minority students were being 
eliminated was lamentable, but preliminary evidence suggests that 
while they were in existence at least some of the teaching was dedi-
cated, demanding, and compassionate. 13 An exploration by Stevens 
would have been welcome. 
Apprenticeship and clinical education suffer the same neglect. 
For much of the history of American legal education, apprenticeship 
was the exclusive or favored route for admission to the bar. In 1947, 
thirty-four states permitted one to enter the profession via appren-
ticeship (p. 217 n.9). And as late as 1966, thirteen jurisdictions per-
mitted admission through law office study exclusively, and five more 
12. See Lawrence, The University of Oregon School of Law 1884-1903: The Thornton 
Years, 59 OR. L. REV. 249 (1980). 
13. See W. BRYSON, supra note 11, at 399-402 & 553-56. These passages are brief biogra-
phies of Clarence McDonald Maloney and Spottswood William Robinson, Jr., both of whom 
taught in the short-lived law department at Virginia Union University. 
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states permitted a mixture of school and practice (p. 219 n.24). As 
originally conceived by Eliot, sound legal education required a 
clinical methodology and legal clinics were associated with law 
schools beginning about the same time that Langdell's model began 
to be widely copied. The University of Denver in 1904 was appar-
ently the first law school to try a clinic as part of its education pro-
gram.14 John Bradway wrote extensively about the educational 
aspects of clinical work beginning in the 1930's (p. 165 n.14) and 
established a long-standing program at Duke, as did Charles Miller 
with his admirable program at Tennessee, which continues to this 
day. By 1968, there was an unexpected and dramatic confluence of 
forces: consumerism and citizen activism, elite bar interest, law stu-
dent activism and demands for relevance, and the funding of the 
Council on Legal Education for Professional Responsibility by the 
Ford Foundation. The result of this confluence was the rise of con-
temporary clinical legal education. The profound educational and 
social concerns embodied by clinical legal education cannot be ex-
plored fairly in the space of three pages. Yet, Chapter 12 concludes 
with just such an effort (pp. 213-16). . 
"Some worried that an 'educational octopus' [the case method 
and Harvard] had achieved far too firm and pervasive a grip on the 
system" (p. 41). Rather than take these concerns seriously, by con-
sidering the possibility that there was something of value in the hold-
outs and innovations, Stevens is content merely to catalog the in-
stances of nonconformity. Unfortunately, in the process, he makes 
them seem more like short-lived aberrations than serious educa-
tional alternatives. Especially for a book the purpose of which is to 
enlighten our understanding of the law schools' "function in the so-
cial evolution of law, lawyers, and higher education" (p. xiii), the 
discussion of alternatives lost or foregone is inadequate. 
In short, Law School i~a_well-executed project of limited scope. 
Exhaustively researched and documented, as well as highly reada-
ble, it may well preempt the field for years to come as the basic insti-
tutional history of American legal education. The limits of the work 
are really the limits of traditional legal education itself - limits of 
breadth, depth, and imagination. Both legal education and Law 
School are limited in breadth because they fail to consider the intel-
lectual and political world outside the law schools. They are limited 
in depth because they do not provide a meaningful account of what 
14. Stoltz, Clinical Experience in American Legal Education: Why Has ii Failed? in 
CLINICAL EDUCATION AND THE LAW SCHOOL OF THE FUTURE 54 n.l (E. Kitch ed. 1970). 
Citations describing early efforts are collected in A. REED, PRESENT-DAY LAW SCHOOLS IN 
THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA 220 n.l (1928). Later citations are collected in D. AL-
SPAUGH, BIBLIOGRAPHY OF MATERIALS ON LEGAL EDUCATION 29-30 (1967). 
For a comprehensive history of clinical legal education in the United States, see Grossman, 
Clinical Legal Education: History and Diagnosis, 26 ]. LEGAL EDUC. 162 (1974). 
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it has been like to teach and learn in law schools over the past one 
hundred years. And they are limited in imagination because they are 
unable to recapture or conceive of opportunities for teaching and 
learning in different ways. 
These limits are not unrelated or accidental. Instead, they grow 
out of a particular vision oflaw as a discipline and an institution, of 
how lawyers practice, and of how students learn to become lawyers. 
Stevens' book is both source and illustration for the explication of 
that vision.15 
IL LEGAL EDUCATION: ITS CAUSE 
Without a monarch or a clearly defined aristocracy, with a practical 
utilitarian outlook, with little by way of competing professions, the 
new nation was almost inevitably bound to rely on lawyers to perform 
a wide range of functions. Lawyers became the technicians of change 
as the country expanded economically and geographically, a develop-
ment that partly explains why even today lawyers play a more signifi-
cant role in the United States than in any other developed society. [P. 
7]. . 
Crucial to the social vision of legal education is a belief in the 
necessity of law and the importance of what lawyers do. Stevens' 
conclusion of near inevitability is an expression in historical terms of 
the prevalent belief that law is indispensable to the economy, polity, 
and society.16 Lawyers are doers, facilitators, advocates, and wise 
men. And as law is necessary, so it is imperialistic. The expansion 
of curriculum reported by Stevens (pp. 159-60, 168 n.40, 213, 222 
IS. After we had completed the manuscript of this review, there appeared in print Robert 
Stevens' article, American Legal Scholarship: Structural Constraints and Intellectual Conceptu-
alism, 33 J. LEGAL Eouc. 442 (1983). The article is an edited text of a presentation at the 
Annual Meeting of the Association of American Law Schools held in Cincinnati on January 7, 
1983. 
In his presentation Stevens offers an approach to legal education that anticipates some of 
our criticisms about his book and legal education more generally. He notes, for example, that 
"the structure oflegal education . • . was created on the assumption that we have a monolithic 
legal profession" and that the law schools have become mere "schools of procedure, rhetoric, 
and process." Id. at 443. He criticizes the AALS for having ''been used to control entry to the 
profession," as the "handmaiden . • . of the ABA," at the risk of "neglecting the vital issues of 
academic scholarship." Id. at 444. Commenting that "[e]ducation in its broader sense has 
moved on, and for the most part law schools are not involved in it," he criticizes legal educa-
tion for having "missed the wider opportunities for legal training," for having "not been seri-
ously involved in skills training outside the analytical skill of 'thinking like a lawyer.' "Id. at 
44S. 
If it were not for the consistency of wit and style, we might find it hard to believe that the 
same Robert Stevens was the author of both the article and the book. We applaud many of the 
insights contained in the article, and only wish that they had been employed in the writing of 
the book. I 
16. See J. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAvt! (1983) (reviewed in this issue). Auerbach 
describes a surprisingly rich tradition of resolving disputes and seeking justice without the 
involvement oflawyers and courts. This book articulately refutes, at least historically, notions 
of the inevitability of law and the indispensability of lawyers. 
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n.43, 271) is evidence of the extent to which lawyers consider every 
form of social intercourse at least potentially within their purview. 
As the nation has become larger, more diverse, and more complex, 
lawyers and law schools have viewed themselves as more, not less, 
important. 
How is it possible that lawyers could play this central role for 
such a socially diverse, politically contentious people? Only because 
they have claimed to be above the fray throughout history. Much of 
the book gives an account of the attempts by legal theorists and prac-
titioners alike to conceive of law as a system of thought and practice 
independent of social forces and political infl.uence.17 The history of 
the case method of law teaching is illustrative of this attitude. As 
originally conceived by Eliot and implemented by Langdell, the case 
method had the virtue of emulating the then-fashionable scientism 
and Darwinism. "[L]aw, considered as a science, consists of certain 
principles or doctrines. . . . [T]he number of legal doctrines is 
much less than is commonly supposed" (p. 52, footnote omitted). 
"Self-contained" and "value free," a set of consistent legal principles 
would remedy 'judicial deviations" of the past and cou~d be applied 
to each new case (p. 53). Langdell's hope that the method could 
reveal the few basic principles of law faded, however, as law's com-
plexity became apparent, but the method was transformed rather 
than abandoned. Under the direction of Ames and Keener, 18 the 
emphasis shifted to process rather than substance and, as today, the 
case method was glorified as the ideal vehicle for teaching students 
to "think like a lawyer'' (pp. 55-56). Thus, though law might not 
have an obvious objective content, it did offer a formal method for 
making decisions. 
Even the case method's establishment critics shared the assump-
tion about the autonomy of law. They might attack the case method 
on practical grounds, but they agreed on the existence of "settled 
principles of law upon which so much of the lawyer's reasoning de-
pends" (p. 59).19 The great failure of the Realist critics, in the eyes 
of many, was their inability to posit an alternative method of analy-
sis which preserved the objective vision of law (p. 156). 
17. For a brief discussion of the professional and ideological demands for creating a 
"buffer zone" between the claims of politics and those of law, particularly as revealed in legal 
historiography, see Horwitz, The Conservative Tradition in the Writing of American Legal His• 
Jory, 11 AM. J. LEGAL HlsT. 275, 278-83 (1973). Horwitz notes that ''what specially character-
izes the profession's conception of modem law - that is, law since the beginning of the 
seventeenth century- is the insistence on a radical separation between law and politics." Id 
at 281. 
18. William Keener's appointment to the Columbia Law faculty in 1890, from Harvard, 
and his advocacy of the case method were factors leading to Dwight's resignation in 1891. P. 
60. 
19. Quoting Report of Commillee on Legal Education, 15 ABA PROCEEDINGS 317, 340-41 
(1892). 
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There are other examples of the dominance of this notion of au-
tonomous law. In not considering the impact of historical events and 
movements, Stevens reflects the general belief that law simply is not 
shaped by such external forces. In legal theory, from formal legal 
reasoning to late p.ineteenth-century classicism (p. 131) to atomistic 
legal reasoning (p. 133) to Lasswell-McDougal policy science (pp. 
264-66), law and lawyers are seen as independent of society but use-
ful to it. Throughout, the emphasis is on the process of lawmaking 
rather than its substantive effects on and its difference from other 
systems of social, political and ethical judgment. 
All of this has had a significant impact on the conception of ap-
propriate forms of legal theory and the relation of theory to legal 
practice. Legal scholarship has overwhelmingly meant the produc-
tion of articles engaging in doctrinal problem-solving (pp. 270-71). 
Legal scholars focus on extremely narrow topics within well-ac-
cepted doctrinal categories; their sources and modes of analysis are 
exclusively legal. This is their appropriate activity because of the 
divorce of legal theory from either more abstract or more concrete 
conceptions. Neither grand theorizing nor the actual workings of the 
legal system or lawyers' practice fit within this limited notion of legal 
scholarship. The occasional exceptions to this pattern, dalliance 
with social science or an empirical version of "law in action," are so 
exceptional and usually so unsuccessful as to be noteworthy. Law 
teachers are really neither "authentic academics" nor "Hessian-
trainers;"20 they have neither full status within academe nor real 
standing and independence within the profession. Extensive contact 
either with other disciplines or practice is unnecessary. 
There is a paradox here. Law is celebrated as being highly func-
tional for the operation of society, but legal theory and legal scholar-
ship are not at all concerned with how that function is really carried 
out by lawyers in practice. The paradox is largely unrecognized or 
unaddressed, in part because of the divorce of legal academics from 
legal practitioners. 
Another aspect of the social vision that underlies legal education, 
in addition to the autonomy and objectivity of law, is the prevailing 
conception of lawyering that regards the bar as hierarchical but uni-
tary. The importance of this unitary conception is evident in the his-
tory of professional self-regulation. A crucial episode in the 
regulation of the bar was the almost uniformly negative reaction to 
Alfred Reed's proposal, for the Carnegie Foundation, that the heter-
ogeneity of the bar be formally recognized in the establishment of a 
differentiated bar (pp. 113-17). Despite considerable evidence that 
20. These terms are from Bergin, The Law Teacher: A Man .Divided Against Himse!f, 54 
VA. L. REV. 637, 638 (1968). 
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the bar was not unitary (pp. 267-68)21 and despite Reed's suggestion 
that the profession's public responsibility could best be served by dif-
ferential training, licensing, and practice, leaders of the bar and the 
academy insisted on maintaining the image that all lawyers were 
equal. 
But some were more equal than others. In the predominant so-
cial vision the model lawyer was and is an idealized image of the 
corporate lawyer.22 The model lawyer was the facilitator of com-
merce and the ally of the dominant institutions of society, the large 
concentrations of wealth. He - until recently, always a he - was 
relied on for his skill in legal reasoning (the stuff oflegal theory) and 
his judgment (his ability to think like a lawyer). While engaged inti-
mately in his client's affairs, he maintained a cool professional de-
tachment from them. Not for the model lawyer were fact-intensive 
and emotionally charged areas of practice (criminal law, personal 
injury litigation, domestic relations), the intense human contact of 
law for the poor, or involvement with political causes. 
Because the profession was unitary, and because there was a 
model lawyer, those who did not conform to the model a fortiori 
should not belong to the profession. Thus, there was a continuing 
effort by the bar and the schools to "raise standards"; that is, to ex-
clude from the profession those who could not be expected to emu-
late the ideal. Training too closely tied to actual practice -
apprenticeship, night schools, and proprietary schools - became the 
institutional target of this effort. The aspirants who relied on these 
routes to the bar, often women, blacks, and ethnics, were the ulti-
mate victims. 
These visions of law and lawyers mandated the content and 
method of teaching in law schools. In all but a few law schools, both 
content and method were largely copies of the Harvard style.23 
Since Am.es's conversion of the case method, the model professor has 
21. Reed's conclusions about the nature of law practice, the functions of lawyers, and the 
role oflaw schools in preparing (or failing to prepare) those practitioners have been confirmed 
in two recent studies of the bar in Chicago: J. HEINZ & E. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: 
THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR (1982); F. ZEMANS & V. ROSENBLUM, THE MAKINO OF 
A PUBLIC PROFESSION (1981). 
22. The basic source on professional ideology in the twentieth century is J. AUERBACH, 
supra note 3. See also Sinion, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional 
Ethics, 1978 Wis. L. REv. 29. 
23. Harvard's influence was even more far-reaching. As Donna Fossum documents, "[t]he 
teachers who constituted the faculties of almost 160 law schools were graduates in dispropor-
tionate numbers of a small, select group of law schools ...• 33.2 percent of all full-time law 
teachers received their J.D. degrees from one of a group of only 5 law schools." Harvard 
headed the list producing over twice the number of graduates in law teaching as Yale, which 
was second on the list. Fossum, Law Professors: A Profile of the Teaching Branch of the Legal 
Profession, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 501, 507. Thus, the Harvardization of American 
legal education was accomplished via program imitation and the dominance, numerically, of 
Harvard graduates in the teaching ranks. 
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taught process more than substance, the process of engaging in the 
. single activity from which lawyers laid claim to their professional 
position: the analysis of cases and statutes. The unarticulated meth-
odology of "tbinkinp; like a lawyer" rather than the communication 
of information or the development of other lawyerly abilities is the 
nearly exclusive aim of legal education.24 Varied forms of pedagogy 
are little used at all. In the contemporary classroom, Socratic dia-
logue is interspersed with lecture and discussion, but these are minor 
variations considering the full range of pedagogical possibilities. 
Huge classes, authoritarian teaching, and final examinations as the 
exclusive evaluation device predominate. The learner who is disad-
vantaged by this peculiar form of instruction falls by the wayside, as 
he or she should. The novice lawyer who leaves law school unpre-
pared for almost anything real lawyers do is no longer the law 
school's responsibility. 
This, then, is the social vision inherent in the history oflegal edu-
cation presented by Stevens: autonomous but certain ( or ascertain-
able) law, elite but democratic lawyers, and narrow but demanding 
training. Trenchant criticism of the way law schools have developed 
dictates dramatic reform of the way they operate today. To con-
clude, we offer a summary of such an alternative - an alternative 
based upon an analysis of how law works, of what lawyers do, and of 
how law students should be educated. 
III. LEGAL EDUCATION: ITS CURE 
In the social vision of traditional legal education, law is determi-
nate and apolitical. In the countervision, law is irrationally indeter-
minate and contingent upon the social world. This alternative view 
suggests attributes of a new model lawyer quite different from the 
elite picture in the traditional vision, and those attributes require a 
different approach to law school learning. 
Stevens notes the effect of the Realist revolution on American 
legal thought: 
The Realists went a long way toward killing the idea of ''the system" 
altogether. All legal logic came under suspicion. American law be-
came increasingly purposive, increasingly secularized, and increasingly 
atomized. [P. 156]. 
What the Realists began, their successors have completed. Both crit-
ics of the legal system25 and its defenders (by their failure to meet 
24. The dominance of the case method has been so great that Stevens devotes a paragraph 
to the Legal Realists' modest innovation of introducing "Cases and Materials on .•. " (as 
opposed to "Cases on ... ") books. P. 158. 
25. E.g., R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND PoLmcs (1975); Kennedy, Form and Substance in 
Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1685 (1976). 
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the Realist challenge)26 have shown us that law is neither an objec-
tive decisionmak.ing process nor capable of being made so. We un-
derstand law to be a system of ethical and political discourse and, 
like other discourse in ethics and politics, it is a vehicle for argument 
and analysis but not for certain decision. 
If law is indefinite, it cannot function in the manner imagined by 
the traditional vision.27 The variety of social forces influencing the 
making of a given body of law or even a particular legal decision 
cannot be reduced to simple notions such as "facilitating commerce" 
or "punishing wrongdoers," and their interaction cannot be pre-
dicted reliably or assessed accurately in particular circumstances. 
Conversely, the social impact of a rule or body of law is not subject 
to secure calculation. 
The new model lawyer can function with neither the detachment 
nor the limited skills of the elite corporate lawyer. This new lawyer 
needs cognitive, affective, and performance capabilities of an en-
tirely different order. Law demystified places an emphasis upon par-
ticular, identifiable lawyer competencies. The first of these 
competencies is the ability to "think like a lawyer" in something like 
the traditional sense. As Stevens documents, from Langdell onward 
that phrase has been embodied with mystical power but has not been 
given explicit meaning. Practically nowhere in the legal literature is 
there a definition of "thinking like a lawyer."28 Thinking like a law-
yer, in our view, constitutes a limited but definite set of cognitive 
skills associated with legal reasoning. These include the acquisition 
of a legal vocabulary, the ability to generate broad and narrow hold-
ings of judicial decisions and thereby to argue precedents, an under-
standing of the nature of legal rule systems and the ability to 
manipulate rule systems in particular cases, and an understanding of 
the systematic nature of legal argumentation and the ability to make 
arguments in the typical patterns of legal discourse. 
This process of thinking like a lawyer is primarily concerned with 
legal doctrine and legal forms. But the new model lawyer must do 
more. No lawyer practices without interacting with other people; 
26. A concise introduction is Mensch, The History of Mainstream Legal Thought, in THE 
POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE, supra note 5, at 18, 26-37. 
27. See generally Feinman, Critical Approaches lo Contract Law, 30 UCLA L. REV. 829, 
847-57 (1983). 
28. So far as we know, the few attempts to give content to the phrase are limited to discus-
sion of case skills. E.g., K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH (1951). Other attempts to define 
what skills law schools should teach tend to be too vague to be of programmatic utility. See, 
e.g., Summers, The Future of Economics in Legal Education: Limits and Constraints, 33 J. 
LEGAL Eouc. 337, 355-58 (1983). Our list of the components of "thinking like a lawyer" 
draws heavily on the analysis of legal education by Duncan Kennedy. See, e.g., Kennedy, 
Legal Education As Training for Hierarchy, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRI· 
TIQUE, supra note 5, at 40, 44-46. For a similar enumeration, see Kennedy, 1 Torts Syllabus 3 
(Sept. 5, 1980) (on file with authors). 
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lawyering requires a variety of interpersonal skills for collaborative, 
consultative, and competitive relations. Nor do legal problems pres-
ent themselves abstractly; the lawyer must have the ability to deal 
with facts, the capacity to discover and analyze both the facts of par-
ticular matters presented and the contextual facts that shape the legal 
decisions to be made. Finally, the lawyer must be able to execute the 
decisions that are made on the basis of law, fact, and interpersonal 
contact. This involves the ability to exploit the appropriate legal 
forms and procedures as well as the ability to implement nonlegal 
strategies in furtherance of client goals. 
The malleability and caprice of legal doctrine and legal process 
constantly place the lawyer in a position of uncertainty. Throughout 
a legal career, a lawyer is faced with new or changed situations for 
which he or she could not have been adequately prepared by educa-
tion or prior experience. One of the key attributes of the new model 
lawyer is a high tolerance for this uncertainty. But tolerance is not 
acceptance. In a number of ways the lawyer can begin to master 
uncertainty. One is through a perspective on the larger legal envi-
ronment, a perspective that places an uncertain situation in a 
broader context. The lawyer also reduces uncertainty by making an 
unfamiliar situation more familiar. Lawyers must be competent at 
learning autonomously and learning with others. It is in this way 
that practitioners can constantly reeducate themselves. Autonomous 
learning, in tum, is furthered by and requires critical self-reflective-
ness. It is critical self-reflectiveness that permits a lawyer to know of 
his or her need for further learning, it is critical self-reflectiveness 
that provides the means of judging one's own performance as a legal 
practitioner (rather than simply adopting prevailing standards), and 
it is through critical self-reflectiveness that one evaluates the opera-
tion of law in society more generally. 
In addition to thinking like a lawyer, the other performance com-
petencies, and the processes of coping with uncertainty, there is at 
least one additional, essential requirement of the model professional: 
judgment. The lawyer must apply legal ideas to factual problems, 
must deliberate by positing alternatives, considering options, and re-
hearsing consequences, must implement the choice, and must then 
accept responsibility for the choice made. In sum, the lawyer's basic 
duty is to perform in the absence of certainty. 
In the countervision, the role of law school is to prepare the stu-
dent to be a model lawyer, to assist the student in acquiring and 
practicing the capabilities discussed above. In the new law school, 
these essential lawyer competencies are the basis for planning the · 
educational program. Of necessity then, the crucial element in the 
new law school is a concern for the education of students. In the 
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traditional law school vision, the focus is on teaching, not learning.29 
For reasons economic, social, and historical - but not educational 
- the dominant style of teaching, the case method, is centered on 
the professor rather than the students. In the new law school, learn-
ing objectives are achieved by a variety of student-centered ap-
proaches and environments such as structured individual and group 
learning, team teaching, formative evaluation, and mastery learning, 
that address the individual needs of the individual learner.30 
Students in the new law school are provided explicit delineation 
of the competencies to be learned and the processes by which they 
will be taught. And in the new law school, the only acceptable level 
of student performance is the mastery of the knowledge and skills 
required of the novice lawyer. Unlike the traditional law school, in 
which student performance is widely distributed and mediocrity is 
accepted as inevitable, the new law school is premised on the convic-
tion that nearly all students can perform at a high level if provided 
with the proper instructional environment.31 Given the law schools' 
informal but important position as gatekeeper for the legal profes-
sion, no lower standard is tolerable. 
Learning in the new law school must include active learning -
the opportunity for students to perform in role.32 Law school must 
prefigure the dilemmas and opportunities of law practice in an edu-
cational setting that minimizes the potential harm to students and 
clients. This is, of course, clinical education, but not merely the per-
formance of lawyerly tasks under occasional supervision, as is the 
norm in many clinical programs. Role performance here inculcates 
the critical self-reflectiveness to be exercised in law practice. Role 
performance in the law school of the countervision implies a rela-
tionship between legal scholarship and legal and educational prac-
tice very different from that which is currently prevalent. It assumes, 
in law as elsewhere, that the immediate and the remote, the concrete 
and the general, are intertwined and can only be understood to-
gether through the interpretation of experience. 
Thus, the cure for legal education. Stevens offers an account 
which testifies to the schizophrenia of law schools, comfortable 
29. Thus, Stevens' failure to refer to any advance in educational theory or practice outside 
the law schools is a wholly appropriate reflection of the view co=only held by law teachers 
that professors of education or educational psychology are either primitives or charlatans. The 
different approach of the countervision of legal education requires openness to educational 
theory. An example of educational theory that is both provocative and especially useful is 
found in B. BLOOM, HUMAN CHARACTERISTICS AND SCHOOL LEARNING (1976). 
30. Readers interested in one application of such methods are invited to contact us for 
information about our experience in teaching Contorts. 
31. See MASTERY LEARNING: THEORY AND PRACTICE (J. Block ed. 1971); B. BLOOM, 
supra note 29. 
32. See Bellow, On Teaching the Teachers: Some Preliminary Reflections on Clinical Educa-
tion as Methodology, in CLINICAL EDUCATION FOR THE LAW STUDENT 374 (1973). 
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neither in the academy or the profession. We propose an alternative 
in which law schools merge theory and practice and, in the process, 
present the opportunity for reconstructing both. 
